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This appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(4). 
Appellant asserts the issue the he has been denied Due process of Law 
by the failure of the Second District Court Clerks and Judges of the Ogden 
Department to comply with The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ad case law 
precedent. 
The Standard of Review is the propriety of the dismissal under this 
Rule is a matter of Law reviewable for correctness. Stokes V. Van 
Wagoner, 1999, Utah 94, 987 P.2d 602. (See Addendum) 
6. The Forth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America 
Utah Court Rules Annotated; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 5(a)(2), Rule 55(a), Rule 55 
(b)(l)&(2), Rule 54(c)(2), Rule 54(d)( 1), Rule 52(c)(1), Rule 8(d), Rule 
12(a), Rule 12(b), Rule 12(e), Rule 12(h), Rule 12(h)(1), Rule 7(a), Rule 
7(b), Rule 7(c)(2), Rule 7(c)(3)(c), Rule 7(d), and Rule 1 l(b)(l)&(2). 
(See Addendum) 
Determinative Case Law; 
Utah Case Law: St Benedicts Dev. Co. V St. Benedicts Hospital 811 
P.2d 194, Russell V. Standard Corp. 898 P.2d 263, Mounteer V. Utah Power 
and Light Co. 823 P.2d 105, Liquor Control Commission V. Athas 243 P.2d 
441, Christensen V. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service Inc. 467 P.2d 
605, Stokes V. VanWagnor 987 P.2d 602, Clark V. Booth 821 P.2d 1146, 
Harvey V. Sanders 534 P.2d 905, Salt Lake County V. Salt Lake City 570 
P.2d 119, Lind V. L\nch 665 P.2d 1276 , Strand V. Associated Students of 
Univ. of Ut. 561 P.2d 191. (See Addendum) 
7. Statement of the Case 
a. This is a civil case asking damages for several miscellaneous causes of 
action. (See Amended Complaint in Addendum) 
b. The original complaint filed 051\ 7 2007 comprising seven causes of 
action and listed on pages 001-005 of the record index. Was followed by an 
amended complaint of eight causes of action file on 06 04 2007 and listed on 
pages 010-013 of the record index. 
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No answer was ever filed by the Defendant Willard Lowe or his 
attorne\ Branden B. Miles within the twenty day period for answering the 
summons. 
The statutory plea period thus expired with no answer filed in this 
case and Plaintiff through his agent. Ursula Cody, notified the Second 
District Court Clerk to make entry of default by Defendant in this case on 
July 3ui 2007. The Clerk refused to make such entry upon oral request, so 
subsequentK Plaintiff filed with the Court Clerk through his agent Ursula 
Cody a written notice to enter default of Defendant on July 5th 2007. (See 
Addendum) 
Defendant Willard Low es alleged answer to the summons and 
complaint supposedly filed with the Second District Court Clerk on 
07/05/2007 and listed as page 027 in the record index was in fact notes 
Plaintiff gave to his agent Ursula Cody to show the Court Clerk the amount 
of damages to be awarded to Plaintiff by the judgment of the Clerk at that 
time. Neither Mr. Lowe nor his Attorney Branden Miles can refute this fact. 
The alleged answer to the summons carries no signature and is therefore in 
violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 7. (See Addendum) Thus 
Plaintiff Jason Cody was and is entitled to a judgment by default against 
Defendant Willard Lowe if the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are to be 
followed. The Second District Court Clerks Office and Second District 
Court Judge Ernie Jones have attempted to ignore the above stated facts and 
instead circumvent the law to suit their own personal preference by claiming 
this non existent answer was filed by the Defendant and/or his Attorney. 
Subsequently Defendants Counsel Branden Miles filed with the Court Clerk 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted ostensibly filed 07/05/2007 pages 032-050 of the record index. The 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was actually filed with the 
Court Clerk on or about 07/09/2007, well after the close of pleadings in this 
case. Plaintiff Jason Cody made several attempts to correct this erroneous 
situation by filing \arious motions and notices with the Court but to no avail. 
The Court insisted on ignoring the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure preferring 
instead to exact the Courts personal idea of justice. The Plaintiff Jason Cody 
then submitted numerous motions to the Court including a motion for leave 
of the Court to amend complaint, motion to order clerk to make Entry of 
Default by the defendant Nunc Pro Tunc to July 5lh 2007, and a motion to 
schedule a hearing to determine the amount of damages to which the 
Plaintiff is entitled. (See Addendum) Subsequently after the appropriate 
time had tolled the Plaintiff submitted notices to submit his afore mentioned 
motions along with notices to submit the Defendants motion to dismiss for 
4 
failure to state a claim and the Defendants motion to consolidate cases 
070902903 and 070902904. All these notices were filed with the Court 
Clerk on 08 27'2007. (See Addendum) The docket for case 070902903 was 
noted on 08,27 2007 that the case has alreadv been dismissed by Court 
ruling from Judge Jones. Court is sending back the Notice to Submit to 
Petitioner mailed 08/29,2007. Prior to the court making a ruling granting the 
defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim signed by Judge 
Ernie Jones 08 23/2007. The Defendants Attornev Branden Miles had not 
filed a notice to submit his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
Therefore the onlv notice to submit the Defendants motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim was filed by the Plaintiff on 08/27/2007 and not 
accepted by the Court and returned to the Plaintiff resulting in no notice to 
submit Defendants motion to dismiss. Thus Judge Jones should never have 
been in a receipt of Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
if the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were followed. (See Addendum) 
The Court Clerk after having refused to accept the filing of the 
Plaintiffs above mentioned notices to submit his motions as well as the 
Defendants motions on 08/27/2007. Nevertheless advised and accepted 
Branden Miles notice to submit his motion to consolidate on 09/17/2007 
pages 123-124 of the record index and Judge Jones Court subsequently 
issued a ruling regarding defendants motion to consolidate the ruling was 
made 09/24/2007 and is listed as 127-128 of the record index. This 
demonstrates bias and preferential treatment of the Defendants filings. 
The disposition of the case at Trial Court is the ruling made by Judge 
Jones on 08/23/2007 granting Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim pages 120-122 in the record index. 
Summary of Argument 
Plaintiff Appellant Jason Codv followed the Utah Court Rules and the 
Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure in filing his initial complaint and summons 
and amended complaint and summons and complied with the Rules of the 
court in all manner and thus was entitled to a judgment by default of the 
defendant when the defendant failed to file an answer to the complaint. The 
Court should ne\er had made a ruling on defendants motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, as a notice to submit such motion was never accepted 
by the Court Clerk and was never submitted by the Defendant or his 
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Attorney Brandon Miles. The Court can t grant a motion that has not been 
brought before the court. 
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that was filed with 
the Court Clerk on or about 07/09/2007 does however ha\e significance in 
that filing such a motion the defendant and his Attorney admit the truth of 
the allegations made in the complaint. Thus they have admitted the 
Plaintiffs allegations by failure to file an answer to the summons and 
complaint and additionally for a second time admitted to the Plaintiffs 
allegations by filing that particular motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Conclusion 
The Plaintiff Appellant Jason Cody has abided by the Utah Rules of 
the Court in filing this action and subsequent notices and motions and 
became entitled to judgment by default of Defendant when defendant failed 
to answer the summons of complaint in the allowed amount of time. 
Plaintiff Appellant then in a diligent fashion notified the Court Clerk of the 
default of Defendant and should have had an award granted at that time or a 
hearing scheduled to determine the amount of damages to which the Plaintiff 
was entitled. The Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant as 
follows: 
1. Reverse the District Courts Ruling and find in favor of the 
Plaintiff 
2. An award of actual damages, (direct and consequential), in the 
amount of $50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Dollars). Plus special 
damages for CAUSE OF ACTION NO. 7 in an amount to be 
determined by the court. 
3. An award of punitive damages four times the amount of actual 
damages awarded. 
4. For all costs inclined and for reasonable attorney's fees in the 
amount of at least $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars). 
5. For interest on all judgment awards, at the highest legal rate in the 
state of Utah. 
6. And for such other and further relief as the court may deem proper. 
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rth Dated this 1 7m da> of April 2008 
Jas&n Cod/Pro se 
'/ 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing Brief of 
the Appellant including Addendum was hand delivered to the Defendant 
Willard Lowe's Attorney Mr. Branden B. Miles on April 18th 2008 at the 
following address Weber County Attorney's Office Branden B. Miles, 
Attorney for the Defendant, Suite No. 230 at 2380 Washington Blvd. Ogden 
Utah 84401-1464. 
Dated this 17th day of April 2008 ^ 
Jason Cody Pro se 
V / 
7 
Page 1 of2 
Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service Whip in IITM|IJII>;JII. 
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court, 
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other than one 
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar 
paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that: 
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the antrt; 
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served 
with all pleadings and papers; 
(a)(2)(C) a paity in default foi aiiy reason shall be served witli notice of any hearing 
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party; 
(a)(2)(D) a party in defaulf fm ,'tny it .r n shrill lid seivet •: • -? - * judgment 
under Rule 58A(d); and 
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in delatill foi 
any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, in which no person is named as defendant, 
any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be 
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(b)(1) If a party is represented by ari attorney, service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party is ordered by the court If an attorney has filed a Notice of 
Limited Appearance under Rule 75 and the papers being served relate to a matter within the 
scope of the Notice, service shall be made upon the attorney and the party. 
(b)(1)(A) If a hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of service, the party shall 
use the method most likely to give prompt actual notice of the hearing. Otherwise, a party shall 
serve a paper under this rule: 
(b)(1)(A)(i) upon any person with an electronic filing account who is a party or attorney in 
the case by submitting the paper for electronic filing; 
(b)(1)(A)(ii) by sending it by email to the person's last known email address if that person 
has agreed to accept service by email; 
(b)(1)(A)(iii) by faxing it to the person's last known fax number if that person has agreed to 
accept service by fax; 
(b)i iHAiimvi h\ in in i. mi I in i HI it to tlif DPI ,i in's last known address: 
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(b)(1)(A)(v) by handing it to the person; 
(b)(1)(A)(vi) by leaving it at the person's office with a person in charge or leaving it in a 
receptacle intended for receiving deliveries or in a conspicuous place; or 
(b)(1)(A)(vii) by leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a 
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. 
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail, email or fax is complete upon sending. Service by electronic 
means is not effective if the party making service learns that the attempted service did not 
reach the person to be served. 
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a judgment 
signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served by 
the party preparing it; and 
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large 
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of 
the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the 
defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes 
notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon the parties in such 
manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed 
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service completed by 
the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related to discovery. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. A party may file with the clerk of court using any means of 
delivery permitted by the court. The court may require parties to file electronically with an 
electronic filing account. Filing is complete upon the earliest of acceptance by the electronic 
filing system, the clerk of court or the judge. The filing date shall be noted on the paper. 
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Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to 
commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an 
answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a 
person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third 
party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except 
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless 
made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity 
the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. 
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause 
shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an existing 
order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to 
show cause to believe a party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex 
parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after 
service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a 
memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters 
raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without 
leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave ot 
the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. 
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and 
a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. 
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted 
by the responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain 
a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated 
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
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(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of 
contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents 
cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a 
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on 
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the 
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If 
no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing 
in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing 
shall be separately identified in the caption of the document containing the request. The court 
shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of 
the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in 
writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the 
same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order 
made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it 
with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, 
motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, 
or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the 
court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's 
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The 
party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court 
commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the 
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as filing a motion within ten days 
after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter 
under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party 
may respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and 
(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different 
types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall 
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the 
substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an 
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader 
intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials 
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general 
denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has 
mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the 
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no 
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(e)(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are 
required. 
(e)(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count 
or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if 
made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and 
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth 
in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
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Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations 
to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. 
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one 
attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented by the party. 
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as binding. 
Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have a notarized, 
verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or 
acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section 
46-5-101. If a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature 
and the party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 46-1-16. 
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected 
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the 
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party 
is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by 
a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines 
that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated 
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately *rom 
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision 
(b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court 
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not 
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing 
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing 
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the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for 
violations committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing 
the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, 
or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule sha'l be 
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others 
similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may 
consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, 
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to 
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a 
violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court 
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made 
by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to 
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the 
provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer within 
twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service 
of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve 
an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer 
within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, 
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does 
not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall 
be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days 
after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to 
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, 
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any 
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated ( l ) - (7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a 
pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined 
before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until 
the trial. , 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous 
that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details 
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within 
such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order 
as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted 
by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other motions herein 
provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and 
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based 
on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply, 
except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if 
one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it 
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall 
dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light 
of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to 
these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
0) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign 
corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be 
awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court 
shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs and 
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Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court 
adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except 
as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for 
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question 
has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law 
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall 
state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the 
court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as 
to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires 
it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically 
prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other 
proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A 
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to 
have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on 
the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk 
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, 
insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the 
register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
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Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as 
provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the 
defendant i f : 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment 
by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a 
judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of 
Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
httD://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ru1es/urcn/i]rcn0SS html 4/17/9008 
Rule 8 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 
denial made pursuant to Subdivision (b). Gen-
eral Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Pratt v. Board of 
Educ, 564 R2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
Notice and opportunity. 
The purpose of Subdivision (c) is to provide 
the parties with notice of the issues raised and 
an opportunity to meet them, and, where a 
party has notice and opportunity, failure of the 
other to plead pursuant to this rule will not bar 
receipt of evidence on a defense. Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963). 
If the interests of justice so require and the 
opposing party is given a fair opportunity to 
meet the defense, the trial court may permit an 
affirmative defense that was not pleaded in the 
answer as required by Subdivision (c) to be 
tried. F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 
2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965). 
Permissive amendment, 
Where the defendant had not moved to 
amend its answer to add an affirmative defense 
after the plaintiff objected to the raising of the 
defense at trial and the trial court did not 
undertake the requisite procedural steps for 
determining whether to allow an amendment, 
the court abused its discretion in permitting 
the defense. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., 
Inc., 1999 UT 13, 974 P2d 288. 
Waiver of defense. 
Because an affirmative defense raises mat-
ters outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie 
case, matters constituting such defenses must 
be pleaded, and are not put in issue by a denial 
pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this rule; failure 
to so plead constitutes waiver of the defense 
pursuant to Rule 12(h). Pratt v. Board of Educ, 
564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
—Fraud. 
Necessary allegations. 
Defendants were not foreclosed from assert-
ing defenses based on fraud by their failure to 
use the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof or 
by their failure to allege every element of com-
mon-law fraud, when the substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged fraud had been 
pleaded. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P2d 663 
(Utah 1985). 
—Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act 
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) constitutes an "affirmative 
defense" or an "avoidance" in a wrongful death 
action alleging negligence, and to preserve the 
act as a defense, it must be raised in the 
defendant's answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
—Mitigation of damages. 
Failure to plead. 
Failure to plead mitigation of damages did 
not result in an automatic waiver of the defense 
where both the pleadings and the parties' open-
ing statements at trial showed that the plaintiff 
plaintiff's failure to mitigate. Price-Orem Inv. 
Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 
55 (Utah 1986). 
Pleading. 
An employer who wishes to obtain the advan-
tage of the rule that a wrongfully discharged 
employee is under an obligation to minimize 
damages, by seeking other employment, must 
raise the matter as an affirmative defense in 
his pleadings. Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 
294 (Utah 1977). 
—Mutual mistake. 
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as 
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima 
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a 
waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Constr. Co., 682 P2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
—Statute of frauds. 
Motion to dismiss. 
The defense of the statute of frauds is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded pur-
suant to Subdivision (c) and may not be raised 
by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b). 
WW. & WB. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 
2d 264, 470 P2d 252 (1970). 
Pleading. 
The statute of frauds is an affirmative de-
fense which must be set forth in the pleadings, 
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1983). 
—Statute of limitations. 
Applicability to plaintiffs. 
Rule that statutes of limitation generally 
must be pleaded or are waived usually applies 
to defendants only; this rule cannot hold plain-
tiff to same accountability; where, in quiet title 
action, defendant attacks validity of tax sale, 
only pleading available to plaintiff to assert 
statute of limitations is in reply, unauthorized 
unjler Rule 7(a) as matter of right, except in 
attacking counterclaim, and otherwise avail-
able only by order of court. Hansen v. Morris, 3 
Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955); Thomas v. 
Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 R2d 507 
(1956), overruled on other grounds, First Eq-
uity Fed., Inc., v. Phillips Dev., 2002 UT 56, 52 
P3d 1137. 
In action to quiet title, plaintiff holders of tax 
deed were not required to plead statute of 
limitations (§§ 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3) and defen-
dants were not required to anticipate defense of 
statute of limitations where statute was first 
pleaded in plaintiff's reply to defendant's an-
swer asserting title. Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 
6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P2d 507 (1956), overruled on 
other grounds, First Equity Fed., Inc., v. Phil-
lips Dev., 2002 UT 56, 52 P.3d 1137. 
In action by water user challenging charges 
of water district, plaintiff waived thirty-day 
limitations statute (§ 17A-2-315) by failing to 
plead it in answer to defendant's counterclaim. 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 
375 P 2d 456(1962) 
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case and is thus not affirmative defense; there-
fore, where defendant failed to deny in answer 
that there was consideration for agreement, 
Tact should be taken as admitted. General Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502 (Utah 1976). 
There is a distinction between lack of consid-
eration and failure of consideration. When con-
sideration is lacking, there is no contract. When 
consideration fails, there was a contract when 
the agreement was made, but the promised 
performance has failed, failure of consider-
ation is an affirmative defense under Subdivi-
sion (c), whereas the defense of lack of consid-
eration, a negative, is properly pleaded under 
Subdivision (b). DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas ex 
rel. First Sec. Bank, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Effect of failure to deny. 
In an action for modification of the custody 
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropri-
ate for the trial court to rule on appellee's 
petition, absent any responsive pleading, and 
to accept the allegations in the petition as true 
in resolving the threshold requirement of 
whether appellant's circumstances had materi-
ally changed; however, it does not follow that 
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default 
must first conclude that the uncontroverted 
allegations of an applicant's petition are, on 
their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v. 
Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
Purpose of rules. 
The fundamental purpose of the liberalized 
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege 
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute, subject 
only to the requirement that their adversaries 
have fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of 
the type of litigation involved. Williams v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
Sufficiency of complaint. 
Complaint need only give fair notice of na-
ture and basis or grounds of claim and indica-
tion of type of litigation; it is sufficient unless 
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of claim. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 
Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). 
Employee's complaint for defamation, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and tor-
tious interference with an employment contract 
clearly alleged the language complained of; the 
employee's failure to set forth any allegation in 
her complaint that a qualified privilege applied 
and that the privilege had been abused was not 
fatal in the context of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. Zoumadakis v. Uintah 
Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 325, 122 
P.3d 891. 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
—Claim against estate. 
Surviving wife's claim as a creditor of her 
husband's estate under an antenuptial agree-
ment was barred by her failure to make the 
claim within one year as required by § 75-3-
803. Merely providing the estate representative 
with a copy of the antenuptial agreement, with-
out explaining how the agreement had been 
breached or the amount the wife was claiming 
as a creditor under the agreement, did not 
satisfy the requirements of notice pleading. In 
re Estate of Uzelac, 2005 UT App 234, 526 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 33, 114 P.3d 1164. 
—Found not sufficient. 
Complaint did not state claim for relief from 
discrimination or arbitrary action where it al-
leged that plaintiff's land, zoned residential, 
was unsuitable for residential purposes, city 
refused to rezone, and zoning ordinance was 
oppressive, confiscatory and unlawful; relief 
required that health, safety, morals or general 
welfare of district and community would be 
promoted by permitting commercial or indus-
trial establishments in residential area. Dowse 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P2d 
723 (1953). 
Use of terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and "neg-
ligence" in complaint constituted general accu-
sations in the nature of conclusions of the 
pleader which, without the setting out of basic 
facts sufficient to constitute the charged ac-
tions, would not stand up against a motion to 
dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 
372 P.2d 990 (1962). 
Complaint claiming that there was a breach 
of the provisions of a title insurance policy, but 
which did not set out the particular provision or 
provisions claimed to have been breached, did 
not meet the requirements of Subdivision (a) 
and was properly dismissed. Ellis v. Hale, 13 
Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962). 
Complaint was insufficient where it con-
tained merely broad and general statements 
that false affidavit and false pleadings were 
filed and judges contacted, and that these ac-
tions prevented plaintiff from obtaining default 
judgment; proper complaint would have con-
tained such allegations as contents, nature or 
substance of false statements and of conversa-
tions between attorneys and judges. Heathman 
v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 
189 (1962). 
Complaint that simply averred that "defen-
dant made, declared and published to certain 
persons certain derogatory and libelous state-
ments relating and pertaining to the plaintiff 
which tended to degrade and discredit him" was 
properly dismissed as not stating a cause of 
action for slander. Dennett v. Smith, 21 Utah 2d 
368, 445 P.2d 983 (1968). 
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P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casi-
no's motion to dismiss a Utah patron's personal 
injury suit, where the patron's complaint al-
leged sufficient facts to support general per-
sonal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of 
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters., Inc., 2001 UT 63, 29 
P.3d 633. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to 
decide upon distribution of trust assets was 
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust ben-
eficiaries to determine distribution and offsets. 
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d 
233, aff d, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148. 
Trial court properly granted judgment on the 
pleadings to defendant restaurants in wrongful 
death action alleging negligence and negligence 
per se against the restaurants for furnishing 
alcohol to decedent, plaintiffs' son, who later 
died when he lost control of his car, because 
Utah does not recognize a common-law, first-
party action against dramshops for injuries 
suffered by an intoxicated person. Miller v. 
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App 80, 520 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9, 110 R3d 144. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogator ies . 
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of 
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the 
pleadings and if the court considers them the 
other party must have the privilege of offering 
answering affidavits as upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v. 
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
Rights of opposing party. 
On review of a motion on the pleadings 
treated as a motion for summary judgment 
under Subdivision (c), the party against whom 
the judgment has been granted is entitled to 
have all the facts presented, and ail the infer-
ences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a 
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co., 
8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P2d 1099 (1958). 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
A motion for a more definite statement, and 
not discovery procedures, is the appropriate 
means of obtaining the information formerly 
sought by a bill of particulars. Securities Credit 
Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P2d 422 
(1953). 
—Criteria. 
A motion for a more definite statement is 
properly made only when the complaint is in-
definite, ambiguous, or vague in either factual 
allegations or legal theory to such an extent 
that the moving party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame his responsive pleading. Li-
quor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 
243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
certain respects to enable defendant to answer, 
the proper remedy is a motion for a more 
definite statement, not a motion to dismiss. 
Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 
243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
—Purpose . 
Delay. 
A motion for a more definite statement 
should be summarily dealt with if made for the 
purpose of delay. Liquor Control Comm'n v. 
Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952). 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motions for a more definite statement are not 
properly used to obtain evidence from the 
pleader. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 
Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952). 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. 
—Conversion. 
Trial court erroneously characterized defen-
dant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for a judg-
ment on the pleadings, which was improper 
because defendants' memorandum and attach-
ments were not pleadings. Because the plain-
tiffs stated a claim for negligence upon which 
relief could be granted, the dismissal of that 
claim could not be justified under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The court should have converted the motion 
into one for summary judgment. Tuttle v. Olds, 
2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 155 
P3d 893. 
—Explained. 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) 
admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on 
those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Bene-
dict's Hosp., 811 P2d 194 (Utah 1991); Russell 
v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
abeas corpus. 
though Rule 65B generally governs the 
drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas cor-
pus petitions, Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule 
applies to habeas corpus petitions in which 
petitioner fails to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 
P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
—Improper. 
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was 
reversed because the record did not persuade 
the appeals court that there was no set of facts 
under which the defendant might succeed. Ol-
son v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (claim of unjust enrich-
ment if no reimbursement for payment made 
on loan guarantee). 
In a wrongful death action based on attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine, the term "aquatic trap" 
in complaint could reasonably be construed to 
refer to a hidden trap and complaint was suffi-
ciently descriptive. Whipple ex rel. Whipple v. 
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 
aTtah 1996). 
channelling devices, bridges, currents, and 
trappings and that as a further direct and 
proximate result of the defective and unreason-
ably dangerous condition of the irrigation ditch, 
plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of financial 
support, comfort, society, advice, care, compan-
ionship, affection and happiness of association 
of the decedent, contained allegations of causa-
tion sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 
R2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court erred in dismissing the plain-
tiff's case because her allegation of facts con-
cerning each element of the claim of breach of 
contract was sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Representative's case was improperly dis-
missed because her complaint was sufficient 
and the defendants below never argued that 
the complaint was inadequate; the trial court 
inappropriately relied on factual determina-
tions from the evidentiary hearing to Afsmiss 
the case. Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 4 6 | Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12, 65 P.3d 1184. 
Trial court erred in dismissing claims for 
fraud, concealment, and other intentional torts 
on the grounds that they were barred by the 
applicable statutes of limitations in Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-12-25(3) and 78-12-26(3). Whether 
the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered 
the claims earlier was a factual finding that 
should be decided by a jury, not a judge. Rus-
sell/Packard Dev, Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 
316, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 78 P3d 616, aff'd, 
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. 
Dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6) of claim 
for injuries suffered at a state liquor store was 
improper; the claim did provide a brief state-
ment of the facts as required by the relevant 
governmental immunity provision. Peeples v. 
State, 2004 UT App 328, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 
100 R3d 254. 
—Parties. 
Adoption agencies' declaratory judgment ac-
tion against an association that had issued an 
advisory opinion on the applicability of an in-
terstate compact failed to state a claim against 
the association because, although the associa-
tion's position was adopted by state officials, its 
opinion was not binding on anyone. Alternative 
Options & Servs. for Children v. Chapman, 
2004 UT App 488, 516 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 106 
P.3d 744. 
—Proper. 
Trial court did not err in granting bank's 
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) 
where the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege 
sufficient facts to support a negligence action; 
the depository bank did not owe the plaintiff, as 
a non-customer of the bank, a duty of care after 
another person forged the plaintiff's signature 
and deposited the checks at the bank. Ramsey 
v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, 483 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10, 79 P3d 423. 
Trial court properly dismissed a complaint 
that was entirely and exclusively dependent on 
the plaintiff's misunderstanding of the defen-
dant's legal obligations toward her and that 
failed to plead a cognizable and actionable 
claim. Pett v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 2004 UT App 
150, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 91 R3d 854. 
Patient's claim was properly dismissed be-
cause the patient's risk of recurrence of breast 
cancer was not an injury; the patient's claim for 
the increased risk of recurrence of cancer was 
not actionable. Medved v. Glenn, 2004 UT App 
161, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 92 R3d 176. 
Church's motion to dismiss was granted in a 
negligence case because it had no common law 
duty to warn abuse victims about a priest's 
prior child sexual abuse. There was no special 
relationship between the parties giving rise to 
such a duty, the abuse did not occur on church 
property or during church functions, and the 
priest was not a church employee, agent, or 
clergy member. Doe v. Corp. of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2004 UT App 274, 506 Utah Adv. 25, 98 
P.3d 429, cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 
2004). 
Business's complaint against the Utah De-
partment of Transportation, following the clo-
sure of an access route to the business during a 
highway reconstruction project, failed to state a 
claim for inverse condemnation under Utah 
Const., Art. I, § 22; the business did not have a 
protectable property interest in an easement of 
access through the blocked routes and the busi-
ness was accessible from another route during 
the reconstruction project. Intermountain 
Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 2004 UT App 405,512 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40, 103 P3d 716, cert, denied, 109 
P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 
126 S. Ct. 343, 163 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2005). 
—Standard. 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences 
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
—Standard of review. 
When reviewing a judgment entered on a 
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6), the 
Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable infer-
ences in its favor. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons 
Co., 790 R2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) 
will be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty 
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & 
Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Prows v. State, 822 P2d 764 (Utah 1991); 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 890 R2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
When reviewing a dismissal under this rule, 
an appellate court must accept the material 
allegations of the complaint as true, and the 
trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no 
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set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v. 
Utah State Land Bd., 795 R2d 622 (Utah 1990); 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
R2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Wright v. University of 
Utah, 876 R2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dis-
missal is a question of law, the appellate court 
gives the trial court's ruling no deference and 
reviews it under a correctness standard. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Rus-
sell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 
1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
In determining whether the trial court prop-
erly granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate 
court must accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v. 
State, 822 P2d 764 (Utah 1991); Whipple v. 
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1996). 
Father did not dispute that the dismissal of 
his prior paternity action was a final judgment 
on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion, 
but merely argued that he did not authorize his 
prior attorney to dismiss the first action; how-
ever, the father's second complaint contained 
no allegation that dismissal of his prior action 
was not authorized. Because the father's sec-
ond litigation was decided on Rule 12(b) motion 
to dismiss, an appellate court did not consider 
factual allegations outside the complaint. (Un-
published decision.) Belloso v. Lindberg, 2005 
UT App 132, cert, denied, 125 P3d 102 (Utah 
2005). 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause in contract. 
The parties' prior agreement in the contract 
that is the subject of the dispute as to the place 
of the action will be given effect unless it is 
unfair or unreasonable. Prows v. Pinpoint Re-
tail Sys., 868 R2d 809 (Utah 1993). 
A plaintiff who brings an action in violation of 
a choice-of-forum provision bears the burden of 
proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or 
unreasonable; to meet this burden, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the chosen state would 
be so seriously an inconvenient forum that to 
require the plaintiff to bring suit there would 
be unjust. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868 
P.2d 809 (Utah 1993). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting the franchisers' motion to dismiss the 
franchisees' breach of contract claim under 
Subdivision (b)(3) where the franchisees failed 
to meet their burden of demonstrating that the 
forum selection clause in the signed agreement 
was unfair or unreasonable; the franchisees did 
not show that suit in Arkansas rather than 
Utah would be difficult and inconvenient. 
Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App 
388. 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 81 P.3d 769. 
and breach of contract alleged by investors who 
lost money in a failed investment venture were 
properly dismissed because the investors failed 
to plead damages to a corporation that had 
assigned its claims to the investors. Coroles v. 
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
79 P.3d 974. 
—Fraud. 
Primary fraud, securities fraud, and second-
ary fraud claims alleged by investors who lost 
money in a failed investment venture were 
properly dismissed because the investors failed 
to plead with particularity, as required by Rule 
9(b), in complaint that merely listed facts and 
then recited the elements of fraud. Coroles v. 
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
79 P.3d 974. 
—How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Since an affirmative defense raises matters 
outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case, 
any matter that does not tend to controvert the 
opposing party's prima facie case should be 
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pur-
suant to Rule 8(b). Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 
(Utah 1986). 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act 
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) is an "affirmative defense" or 
an "avoidance" in a wrongful death action alleg-
ing negligence, and, to preserve the act as a 
defense, it must be raised in the defendant's 
answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 
793 P2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
Divorce. 
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's 
motion to dismiss and for a more definite state-
ment in answer to plaintiff's divorce petition 
alleging cruelty and habitual intoxication in 
general terms. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 
Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). 
Election of remedies. 
The*defense of election of remedies is an 
affirmative one that must be raised by way of 
answer, motion, or demand and may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Royal Re-
sources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 
793 (Utah 1979). 
Failure to state claim upon which re-
lief can be granted. 
A complaint does not fail to state a claim 
unless it appears to a certainty that the plain-
tiff would be entitled to no relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support 
of the claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 
121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952); Christensen 
v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 
Utah 2d 165, 467 R2d 605 (1970). 
A complaint is required to give the opposing 
party fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of 
the type of litigation involved, or it is subject to 
dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel 
& Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 R2d 
since the contract to review bids on an equal 
basis was too nebulous to be enforceable, and 
the city is immune to tort action for deceit. 
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1974). 
In an unlawful detainer action in which the 
notice is defective, the defective notice results 
in a failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted rather than lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
General and special appearances. 
The distinction between general and special 
appearances has been abolished by Subdivision 
(b) of this rule. Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. 
Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976). 
Statute of frauds. 
The defense of the statute of frauds is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded pur-
suant to Rule 8(c) and may not be raised by a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision (b) of 
this rule. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pampas, 
24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970). 
Venue. 
A motion to dismiss is not the correct form for 
objecting to venue improperly laid; an objection 
to venue should be made by a motion for change 
of place of trial. Cannon v. Tuft, 3 Utah 2d 410, 
285 P2d 843 (1955). 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Motion for leave to file an amended answer 
was properly denied where movant failed to file 
anything in support of the motion and did not 
call the motion for hearing until the case was 
called for trial four months later. Hein's Turkey 
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 
24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (1970). 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
An objection raised that security for costs 
was not filed within one month after notice is at 
best but a technical one. Dismissal of action 
with prejudice was an abuse of discretion since 
the policy of the law is to minimize the effect of 
technical objections which do not go to the 
merits and are not prejudicial to the interests of 
the parties. Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D. 
Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P2d 191 
(1954). 
Where plaintiff died 16 days after initiating 
suit, and 11 days after demand of a nonresident 
cost bond under Subdivision (j), and, though 
almost three months later, a surety bond was 
filed as soon as an administrator was ap-
pointed, trial court should not dismiss action 
for failure to file bond within 30 days. Ham-
mond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 P2d 562, 
cert, denied, 361 U.S. 813, 80 S. Ct. 51, 4 L. Ed. 
2d 60 (1959). 
Standard of review. 
The propriety of a dismissal under this rule is 
a question of law, reviewable for correctness. 
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 987 P2d 
602. 
Statute of limitations. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
considering information outside of the com-
plaint for purposes of the relevant date of the 
inception of the loss for statute of limitations 
purposes. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947. 
Summary judgment. 
—Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision 
(b)(6) may be converted to summary judgment 
only when it appears as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff cannot recover; and where there was a 
question of actual knowledge of defendant as to 
the claim against the property, motion to dis-
miss and summary judgment were improper. 
Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975). 
Motion for dismissal in action for declaratory 
judgment as to constitutionality and legality of 
annexation conditions properly treated as mo-
tion for summary judgment. See Child v. City of 
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975). 
It is generally not well advised to treat a 
motion to dismiss as one for summary judg-
ment. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 
P2d 119 (Utah 1977). 
Where defendant's motion was initially for 
dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, once 
matters outside the pleadings were presented 
to and not excluded by the trial court, the 
motion was properly treated as one for sum-
mary judgment. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1983); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 
874 P2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
If a trial court cannot on its own motion 
convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment, then certainly 
the Supreme Court should not allow the mov-
ing party to do so on appeal. Colman v. Utah 
State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
When affidavits or other evidence is pre-
sented to support a motion to dismiss under 
Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule and the court 
does not exclude them, the motion is generally 
treated as a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to U.R.C.P 56. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, 
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996). 
This rule does not convert motions based on 
subdivisions (b)(1) through (5) into motions for 
summary judgment simply because they in-
clude some affirmative evidence relating to the 
basis for the motion. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 
82,987 P.2d 36; Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 
86, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 
(2003). 
—Court's discretion. 
If a motion to dismiss under Subdivision 
(b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider 
matters outside the pleadings initially lies in 
the discretion of the trial court. Strand v. Asso-
ciated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1977). 
—Court's initiative. 
A court should not, on its own initiative, try 
to convert a motion for dismissal into one for 
summary judgment by requesting additional 
evidence. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 
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mitted range of discretion in making an award 
for such costs. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 R2d 508. 
—Service on adverse party. 
This rule requires that only one verified copy 
be served and it is to be served to the court; 
there is no requirement that the copy served 
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be 
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380 
R2d 926 (1963). 
—Statutory limits. 
Award of costs in excess of those expressly 
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, 
witness fees and preparation of model, photo-
graphs and certified copies of documents was 
improper even though the costs represented the 
actual expenses incurred; fact that Supreme 
Court has on occasion approved taxing of ex-
pense of depositions as costs should not be 
taken as opening the door to other expenses of 
the character claimed in the instant cas'e. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 R2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of 
process expenses are chargeable only in accor-
dance with the fee schedule set by statute. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 R2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Witness compensation in excess of the statu-
tory schedule is generally inappropriate as a 
cost. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 R2d 684 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
—Time for claiming. 
Although the trial court may not award costs 
until after the appeal, if any, the delay in the 
award of costs does not excuse parties who 
want to request costs from complying with the 
deadline in this rule. Aurora Credit Servs. v. 
Liberty W Dev., Inc., 2007 UT App 327, 588 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, — R3d —. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
Although plaintiff filed an unverified memo-
randum of costs within five days after entry of 
judgment, because he did not file a verified 
memorandum of costs until after the five-day 
period, plaintiff was not entitled to an award of 
costs. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York 
Term. Whse. Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d 626 
(1960). 
Plaintiffs who were contractually entitled to 
attorney fees, costs, and expenses, and applied 
for them five weeks after judgment in their 
favor, were not barred from receiving an award 
of such fees by Subdivision (d)(2) because the 
rule does not apply to expenses or attorney fees. 
Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 
160 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992). 
Failure of defendants to file a verified mem-
orandum of costs within five days of the judg-
ment required that an award of costs be deleted 
from the judgment. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
The requirement that a verified memoran-
dum of costs be filed within five davs after the 
who failed to comply with the requirement that 
she file and serve a memorandum of costs 
within five days after entry of judgment. 
Grindstaff v. Sheville (In re Sheville), 2003 UT 
App 141, 473 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 71 R3d 179. 
—When not demanded. 
Fact that plaintiff did not ask for attorney 
fees in his complaint did not preclude trial 
court from awarding them to him since this rule 
indicates that there shall be liberality of proce-
dure to reach result which justice requires. 
Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 
R2d 325 (1969). 
District court's award of attorney fees in 
excess of the fees demanded in the complaint 
and of costs where no costs were demanded was 
proper where the proof at trial showed the 
party was entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope, 
589 P2d 752 (Utah 1978). 
Default judgments. 
Subdivision (c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the 
procedure to be followed by trial courts in 
entering judgments against defaulting parties, 
and courts are not at liberty to deviate from 
those rules just because one party is in default 
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of 
the case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1984). 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
The entry of a final judgment as to fewer than 
all of the parties or claims does not affect the 
ability of the district court to proceed with 
respect to the remainder of the claims and 
parties; and when an appeal is taken from such 
a judgment, it only brings before the Supreme 
Court that portion of the action with respect to 
which the judgment has been entered, and the 
rest of the action remains in the trial court and 
is not necessarily affected by the appeal. Lane 
v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1984). 
Fi&al order. 
—Appealability. 
The final judgment rule, Subdivision (b), ap-
plies when the trial court orders a separate 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving 
issues and parties before that court, will de-
prive the appellate court of jurisdiction over an 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1991). 
Appeal of an order that was not final and 
neither certified nor eligible for certification 
under Subdivision (b) was not properly taken, 
and the remedy was dismissal of the appeal. 
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 R2d 
323 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants, who did not seek permission to 
file an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and who 
had, because no final judgment had been en-
tered in the cases, alternative avenues under 
Rules 54(b) and 65B(e) of the Utah Rules of 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 55, ER.C.P 
Damages. 
Divorce action. 
Entry of default not warranted. 
Failure to plead. 
Judgment. 
—Conduct of counsel. 
—Default entry necessary. 
—Failure to follow rule. 
—Hearing on merits. 
—Punitive damages. 
Notice. 
Setting aside default. 
—Collateral attack. 
—Direct attack. 





—Setting aside proper. 
Time for appeal. 
Cited. 
Damages. 
A default judgment establishes, as a matter 
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as 
to each cause of action alleged in the complaint. 
Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon the 
nondefaulting party to establish by competent 
evidence the amount of recoverable damages 
and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue of 
damages once default has been entered. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
To enter a default judgment for unliquidated 
damages, a judge must review the complaint, 
determine whether the allegations state a valid 
claim for relief, and award damages in an 
amount that is supported by some valid evi-
dence. Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 
1071 (Utah 1998). 
Divorce action. 
Defendant who failed to file answer in di-
vorce action was not entitled to hearing or 
notice before entry of default divorce decree 
even though 90-day statutory period had not 
elapsed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P2d 1040 (Utah 
1975). 
Entry of default not warranted. 
This rule requires an entry of default against 
a defendant who fails to appear only if the 
well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff 
who alleged that the defendant provided neces-
sary and reasonable medical services to the 
plaintiff in one count and then sought a declar-
atory judgment in another count alleging the 
Failure to plead. 
In an action for modification of the custody 
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropri-
ate for the trial court to rule on appellee's 
petition, absent any responsive pleading, and 
to accept the allegations in the petition as true 
in resolving the threshold requirement of 
whether appellant's circumstances had materi-
ally changed; however, it does not follow that 
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default 
must first conclude that the uncontroverted 
allegations of an applicant's petition are, on 
their face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party Stevens v. 
Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
Judgment. 
Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice and 
fair play. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 
Utah 2d 60, 377 P2d 189 (1962). 
—Conduct of counsel. 
When defendant's counsel was 27 minutes 
late on morning trial was commenced because 
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme 
Court a writ of prohibition to prevent the hold-
ing of the trial on that day due to absence of 
defense witnesses, the trial court erred in 
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and 
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate 
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiff's evi-
dence, notwithstanding any ill-advised, irritat-
ing or contemptuous conduct from defense 
counsel during the action, since the law prefers 
that a fcase be tried on its merits and the parties 
litigant should not be made to suffer for the 
misconduct of their counsel. McKean v. Moun-
tain View Mem. Estates, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 323, 
411 P2d 129 (1966). 
—Default entry necessary. 
No default judgment may be entered under 
Subdivision (b)(2) unless default has previously 
been entered. The entry of default is an essen-
tial predicate to any default judgment. P & B 
Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P2d 274 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
—Failure to follow rule. 
Rule 54(c)(2) and this rule prescribe the pro-
cedure to be followed by trial courts in entering 
judgments against defaulting parties, and 
courts are not at liberty to deviate from those 
rules just because one party is in default and is 
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the 
case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1984). 
Judgment against defaulting party must be 
Jason Cody 
ProSe 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden,UT 84409 
Phone: (801)627-1182 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER 






NOTICE TO MAKE ENTRY 
OF DEFAULT BY 
DEFENDANT 
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE 
ERNIE W. JONES 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that in accordance 
with the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule No. 55, the court clerk MAKE 
AN ENTRY OF DEFAULT BY THE DEFENDANT, in the above entitled action, this 51 
day of July 2007. 
Defendant was personally served with the 20 DAY SUMMONS and the 
AMENDED COMPLAINT on June 11, 2007. 
The time has tolled ant the 20 days have expired with no answer or response by 
the Defendant, thus it is proper to make entry of Judgment by Default in favor of the 
Plaintiff, at this time. 
ORDER 
The request having been made by Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and good cause 
appearing, the Clerk of the Second District Court hereby enters a Judgment By Default 
against the Defendant, Willard Lowe, and in favor of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody on this 
day of July 2007, for all claims made by Plaintiff in this action. 
BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
Dated this day of July 2007. 




P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden,UT 84409 
Phone: (801)627-1182 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER 







JUDGEMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 
BY DEFAULT OF DEFENDANT 
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE 
ERNIE W. JONES 
On June 11,2007, Defendant Willard Lowe was personally served with a 20 
DAY SUMMONS and a copy of the complaint filed with the court by Plaintiff, Jason 
Cody, in the above entitled matter. 
Time having tolled and the 20 day period for Defendant to file an answer to the 
complaint having expired on July 02,2007, with no answer or response filed with the 
court by Defendant. 
Now therefore, in accordance with the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
Rule 55, addressing Judgment by Default, Plaintiff, Jason Cody, hereby requests that 
Judgment by Default be entered by the Court, in favor of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, in this 
matter at this time, July 05,2007, for all Plaintiffs claims. 
ORDER 
For the forgoing reasons, and good cause appearing, the court in accordance with 
Rule 55 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, hereby grants Plaintiffs request 
and hereby enters Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Jason Cody, on all of the claims made 
in the complaint by Plaintiff, Jason Cody. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated this day of July 2007. 










Medical Cell M6 
P.O. Box 14000 
Ogden,UT 84412 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER 






EXPARTE MOTION SUBMITTING 
PREPARED ORDER FOR 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE 
ERNIE W. JONES 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he hereby submits this ORDER 
for FINAL JUDGMENT prepared in accordance with The Utah Rules For Civil 
Procedure, Rules 54 and 55. 
The court may utilize this PREPARED ORDER, if it chooses to do so, to wholly 
dispose of all claims in this case at this time. Pursuant to the requirement of Rule 54(b), 
and solely for the purpose to allow the court to make a FINAL JUDGMENT in this 
action, the Plaintiff hereby waives his request for award of Punitive Damages in this 






amount certain of $50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Dollars), plus costs in amounts of $155.00 
(One Hundred Fifty Five Dollars) filing fee and $30.00 (Thirty Dollars) process service 
fee, for a total award in the amount certain of $50,185.00 (Fifty Thousand One Hundred 
Eighty Five Dollars). To be the FINAL JUDGMENT award, disposing of this case. In 
the event that such Judgment is set aside for any reason, then too the Plaintiffs waiver of 
attorney's fees and Punitive Damages will also be nullified and withdrawn at the same 
time the Judgment is set aside. 
Dated this 9th day of July 2007. 











Medical Cell M6 
P.O. Box 14000 
Ogden, UT 84412 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND OF WEBER 






! ORDER FOR FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE 
ERNIE W. JONES 
Upon MOTION of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and good cause appearing, 
The Court hereby ORDERS Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, for actual 
Damages in the amount of $50,000 (Fifty Thousand Dollars) and costs of filing fee, 
$155.00 (One Hundred Fifty Five Dollars), and costs of Process Service, $30.00 (Thirty 
Dollars), with $10.00 (Ten Dollars) awarded for attorney's feels and $0.00 (Zero Dollars) 
Awarded for Punitive Damages, for a total award of $50,185.00 (Fifty Thousand One 
Hundred Eighty Five Dollars), as FINAL JUDGMENT in this action. 
01 •'/ ton " ' °Hc0 / Dated this day of July 2007. 
' V^ m .... 
f% BY THE COURT 
°IJUL 
Ernie W. Jones 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 
. L . . _ ^ _ 
jjj&ibfc^diyfcfiu^ 
po. Box <ns* 
Webe* County, ST£te o£ ttt<*k 






j Q d l f i g O t a t a L i i ; ^ ^ K e 
i ^ k i f i t r j t ^ ^ 
Jfcaaam£^-J2k3ulY-^^ ui^j^atoflk-AiLSL 
iJyLte i^^ 
r ^ ^ a j a e j s ^ - ^ t ^ JUL&cP_ i A.*ikx mcfriet sine*. JXuly_©s, 3&5jk 
j JUsLlwsii %ut4jHt£j&rfWt «Kk dtJfcst Tins o t i x c e ^ t ^ cleht« 
H-- D*W.ik<> fc*A*rf &k&fi5*. 
4~T~ — - ~ 
Cftic** ofJ) 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating ail the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any 
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof m a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
http://www.utcoiir^ 6/11/2007 
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Rule 55. Default 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend 
as provided by these rules and that fad is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against 
the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, \n 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine 
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state 
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
http://www.utcourts^ 6/11 /2007 
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NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Motion to order clerk to make Entry of 
Default by the defendant Nunc Pro Tunc 
to MyiS^ 2007 
Civil No. 070902903 mi 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that his motion to 
th 
order the clerk to make Entry of Default by the defendant Nunc Pro Tunc to July 5 2007 
filed July 20th 2007 now be submitted to the court for decision. 
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007 
Jas/ifi'Cody Pro Se, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380 
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007 
Jason Cody Pro Se 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden, Utah 84409 
Phone (801)627-1182 
In The Second Judicial District Court In and For 







NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Motion to schedule a hearing to 
determine the amount of damages to 
which plaintiff is entitled 
Civil No. 070902903 mi 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that his motion to 
schedule a hearing to determine the amount of damages to which plaintiff is filed July 
20th 2007 now be submitted to the court for decision. 
7th Dated this 27m day of August, 2007 
Jason Cody Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380 
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
7th Dated this 27m day of August, 2007 ^zf^. 
Jasop^Zody Pro Se 
^ 2 3 
Jason Cody Pro Se 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden, Utah 84409 
Phone (801)627-1182 
In The Second Judicial District Court In and For 







NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Motion for leave of the court 
to amend complaint 
Civil No. 070902903 mi 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he requests that his motion for 
leave of the court to amend complaint filed July 20th 2007 now be submitted to the court 
for decision. 
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380 
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007 
Jason Cody Pro Se 
P.O. Box 9732 
Ogden, Utah 84409 
Phone (801)627-1182 
In The Second Judicial District Court In and For 







NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Defendants motion to consolidate 
Civil No. 070902903 mi 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7 d, he requests that defendants motion to consolidate, 
filed July 26th 2007 by defendants attorney Branden B-Miles, and the memorandum in 
opposition filed by plaintiff Jason Cody Pro Se on or about August 13th 2007now be 
submitted to the court for decision. 
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007 J/j>/)i7*<-
Jasotf Codv Pro i . y  Se/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice to submit, by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon attorney for the defendant, Branden B-Miles, 2380 
Washington Blvd, Suite 230, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
Dated this 27th day of August, 2007 
it 
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BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN #9777 & 
2830 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 230 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
^®IF¥ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
) 
JASON CODY ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
v. ) 
) 
WILLARD LOWE ) Case No. 07090293 MI (Lowe) 
) Judge Ernie W. Jones 
and ) 
) 
RENEE HANCOCK ) Case No. 070902904 MI (Hancock) 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Defendants ) 
1 
Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court to consolidate the two cases into one case pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42. The reasons supporting this consolidation are 
explained below. 
FACTS 
On May 18, 2006, the plaintiff, Jason Brad Cody, brutally assaulted Willard Lowe and 
Renee Hancock in front of their home. During a dispute over the location of a potted tree, the 
plaintiff punched Willard Lowe, a 74-year-old man who weighed about 125 pounds, in the 
stomach, causing him to fall to the ground. Once Mr. Lowe fell to the ground, the plaintiff, who 
was 56-years-old and weighed more than 200 pounds, jumped on top of Mr. Lowe and pinned his 
arms underneath him. From this position, the plaintiff repeatedly punched, slapped, and slammed 
1 
Mr. Lowe's head onto the asphalt of the roadway. Renee Hancock, 69-years-old, observed the 
plaintiff punching Mr. Lowe and ran out to help. Ms. Hancock attempted to pull the plaintiff off 
of Mr. Lowe, but the plaintiff seized her hand and bit down, breaking a bone and severing a 
tendon in her finger. 
Eventually a neighbor pulled the plaintiff off of Mr. Lowe, and the police were called. 
The police and medical personnel arrived to treat Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock, and both were 
transported to a hospital. Mr. Lowe sustained multiple abrasions to his head, his eye was severely 
swollen, and he was bleeding profusely from various cuts in his head. Ms. Hancock was treated 
for the broken bone in her hand and had a tendon partially severed in her pinky. She has since 
undergone physical therapy but continues to have problems with numbness and her ability to 
hold things with that hand. The plaintiff had no serious injuries. 
The plaintiff was charged with Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony; Assault with 
Substantial Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor; and Criminal Mischief, a class A 
misdemeanor. Information on the criminal case can be found under case number 061902461. 
On February 15, 2007, after the evidence was heard during a non-jury trial, the Plaintiff 
was found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt for these offenses. On April 2, the Plaintiff was 
sentenced to a suspended prison sentence with formal probation and 180 days in the Weber 
County Jail. He is currently an inmate at the jail. 
Around June 1, 2007, the plaintiff filed two separate claims against Willard Lowe and 
Renee Hancock. Each claim cited against both defendants causes of action of harassment, 
malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting false claims, conspiracy to commit 
perjury and obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious 
2 
prosecution. The facts alleged under each claim in both complaints are, overwhelmingly, 
identical. Specifically, the facts supporting the causes of action of submitting false claim, 
obstruction of justice, perjury, conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice and perjury, malicious 
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are verbatim. 
The causes of action for harassment and malicious mischief also contain factual 
allegations that are nearly identical. Under the cause of action for harassment, the plaintiff alleges 
that both defendants caused a potted tree and a truck to be placed in the roadway near the 
plaintiffs driveway. Further, under the cause of action for malicious mischief, the plaintiff 
alleges that both defendants caused water damage to the plaintiffs shed and caused paint 
scratches on the plaintiffs car. The only variations between the two complaints are where the 
plaintiff alleges, first, that Renee Hancock is liable to him for making false statement to a mobile 
home park organization and for spreading moth balls, and, second, that Willard Lowe is liable to 
him for assault, trespass, and taking "unwelcome" photographs. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST WILLARD LOWE AND RENEE 
HANCOCK SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED BECAUSE EACH ACTION 
PRESENTS NEARLY IDENTICAL QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. 
A court may consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact in order to 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.1 Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). Trial courts have broad discretion in 
deciding motions to consolidate. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 105 P. 3d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Here, at first glance, the plaintiffs complaints against both Willard Lowe and Renee 
Hancock present nearly identical questions of both law and fact. Legally, the plaintiff alleges that 
both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock are liable to him for the same eight claims: harassment, 
malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting false claims, conspiracy to commit 
perjury and obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious 
prosecution. Further, under the plaintiffs cause of action heading of "harassment," an additional 
claim of private nuisance was identified given the facts alleged. 
Factually, each claim is supported by nearly identical facts. The facts supporting the 
plaintiffs claims against both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock for obstruction of justice, perjury, 
conspiracy, submitting false claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious 
prosecution are verbatim. Similarly, under the plaintiffs claim of harassment, identical facts are 
1 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 42, reads as follows: "(a) When actions involving a common question of law or 
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; 
it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (1) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first 
case Notice of a motion to consolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each case. The order denying or granting 
the motion shall be filed in each case. (2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of the first case filed 
shall be used for al subsequent papers and the case shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first case. The 
presiding judge may assigned the case to another judge for good cause." Utah R. Civ. P. 42. 
4 
presented regarding a potted tree and a truck parked on a street.2 Further, under the plaintiffs 
claim for malicious mischief, identical facts are presented regarding water damage to the 
plaintiffs shed and paint scratches to the plaintiffs car. 
The only differences between the two complaints are found under the claims for 
harassment and malicious mischief. First, under the plaintiffs claim for harassment, Ms. 
Hancock is accused of making false accusations to a mobile home park organization; Mr. Lowe, 
on the other hand, is accused of assault, trespass, and taking "unwelcome" photographs of the 
plaintiff. Second, under the plaintiffs claim for malicious mischief, Ms. Hancock is again 
accused of making false statements to a mobile park organization and of spreading moth balls3; 
Mr. Lowe is again accused of assault. 
These differences are superficial at most. The plaintiffs complaints against both Mr. 
Lowe and Ms. Hancock can be traced back to two common events: first, a common-place dispute 
between neighbors, and, second, a criminal trial where the plaintiff was found guilty of brutally 
assaulting both Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock. Yet even these two events are related 
because a neighborly dispute over the location of a potted tree is what caused the plaintiff to 
assault the defendants. 
The majority of the plaintiffs claims against Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock-specifically, 
those claims of obstruction of justice, perjury, conspiracy, submitting false claim, malicious 
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress-are related to the criminal 
2 These are the claims which could constitute private nuisance. 
3 That Renee Hancock allegedly spread moth balls is another accusation the defense will assume could be 
considered a private nuisance. 
5 
proceedings in which the plaintiff was prosecuted for assaulting Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock. 
Logically, since these claims against Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock arise out of a single criminal 
trial, the two are factually related and should, therefore, be consolidated. 
The remaining claims of harassment and malicious mischief are related to the property 
dispute between these neighbors. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock share a home which once 
neighbored the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has identified both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock, not just 
one or the other, as the persons responsible for his alleged harm. Thus, logically, these claims are 
also factually related. Additionally, in both of the plaintiffs complaints against Mr. Lowe and 
Ms. Hancock, the plaintiff referred to other persons such as "guest[s]" and "friend[s]" though the 
plaintiff does not further identify those persons. However, given the nearly identical facts and the 
similarity of the charges alleged in both complaints, it can logically be inferred that the plaintiff 
was referring to Mr. Lowe in his complaint against Ms. Hancock and referring to Ms. Hancock in 
his complaint against Mr. Lowe. Because this neighborly dispute involves both Mr. Lowe and 
Ms. Hancock it seems only logical that the two actions should be consolidated. 
Furthermore, by consolidating these cases, this court would avoid unnecessary costs, 
delay, and inconvenience, not only to the defendants but to the plaintiff as well since both would 
only need to be concerned about one hearing instead of two. Additionally, rather than using 
already sparse judicial resources by assigning the plaintiffs claims to two separate judges this 
case would only be assigned to a single judge. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the plaintiffs claims against Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock should be 
consolidated because both present nearly identical questions of both law and fact. Legally, the 
6 
plaintiffs complaint against both Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock are nearly identical as both involve 
causes of action of harassment, malicious mischief, obstruction of justice, perjury, submitting 
false claims, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and 
private nuisance. Factually, under each cause of action the plaintiff alleges facts against both Mr. 
Lowe and Ms. Hancock that are verbatim. Logically, the plaintiffs complaints against Mr. Lowe 
and Ms. Hancock arise out of a single criminal trial or a neighborly dispute: both are factually 
related and both involve Mr. Lowe and Ms. Hancock. 
Dated this'"/? 5 day of July, 2007. / 
Branden B. Miles 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed on the ALP day of July, 2007, a copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO CONSOLIDATE to: 
Mr. Jason Cody 
Inmate No. 215687 
Medical Cell M6 
Weber County Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 14000 
Ogden, Utah 84412 
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COURT'S RULING REGARDING MOTION 
TO CONSOLIDATE 
Case No: 070902903 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: September 24, 2007 
A motion to consolidate this case with another case assigned to 
Roger S. Dutson was filed by Attorney Branden Miles on July 26, 
2007. A notice to submit for decision was submitted September 17, 
2007. The Court finds that there is no reason to consolidate this 
case because this case was dismissed for failure to state claim on 
August 23, 2007. Judge Dutson has also indicated that he intends to 
dismiss the other case. The motion to consolidate is, therefore, 
denied. 
^L 
Judge ERNIE W JONES] 
Page 1 
Case No: 070902903 
Date: Sep 24, 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070902903 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JASON CODY 
Plaintiff 
P O BOX 9732 
OGDEN, UT 844090732 
Mail BRANDEN B MILES 
Attorney DEF 
23 80 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 230 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
Dated t h i s day of SEP 2 4 2007 20 . 
J 
I fytorti lklmtm> r Dep'uty Cour t CI 
Page 2 ( l a s t ) 
4 




- y * 
if idtl&|\:feLJ^ 
lb Whick Bo**.tt«§£ ftp eyfctteA 








 - - . J ^ l i o M ^ c j f c m ^ f e e d ^ ^ 
Cf«riw* -felr he.li«£«_ O/SDn VC SuitLakA CSIS/ 
Ojsatejyusd^ WLkkJ&fct&ij. 
[ Jk te^ 
H f c V D ^ J & o u l e ^ ^ W v £ 
aAeafc^^ 
J S j e a f c l l L ^ k & L ^ J h ^ 
J&i&s&ak&L-* 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the courts initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than ail of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entittedfeven if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any 
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof m a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
http://www.utcourts.^ 6/11 /2007 
Rule 55- Default 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend 
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against 
the defendant if : 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine 
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state 
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
http://www.utcourts.gov^^ 6/11/2007 
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CASE NUMBER 070902904 Miscellaneous 
Securities bonniejs 
21-07 Note: Left message with Ursula Cody at phone number on 
documents that Plaintiff failed to have a certificate of 
mailing on documents. vickiv 
06-04-07 Filed: Notice to Submit Prepared Order Waiving Plaintiff's 
Fees, Costs, And Securities vickiv 
06-04-07 Filed: Prepared Order Waiving Plaintiff's Fees, Costs, And 
Securites vickiv 
06-04-07 Note: Rec: Order Waiving Plaintiff Fees, Costs, And Securitiesvickiv 
06-14-07 Filed: Amended Complaint Of: Harassment, Malicious Mischief, 
Obstruction Of Justice, Perjury, Submited False Claims, 
Conspiracy To Commit Perjury And Obstruction Of Justice, And 
Intentional Infliction Of Extreme Emotional Distress, Malicious 
Prose vickiv 
06-14-07 Filed: Summons vickiv 
06-14-07 Filed: Notice to Submit Affidavit Of Impecuniosity vickiv 
06-14-07 Filed: Affidavit Of Impecuniosity vickiv 
06-14-07 Filed return: Summons and Complaint (No Summons attached) trinaw 
Party Served: HANCOCK, RENAE 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 11, 2007 
06-19-07 Note: File to RSD vickiv 
06-21-07 Filed order: Order Denying Waiver of Fees cariel 
Judge rdutson 
Signed June 21, 2007 
06-21-07 Filed: Order Waiving Court Fees filed unigned per 06/21/2007 
order cariel 
0 5-07 Filed: Complaint No Amount mariag 
07-05-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 mariag 
07-05-07 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 mariag 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
07-05-07 Note: Rec: Order Awarding Judgment For Plaintiff By Default Of 
Defendant vickiv 
07-05-07 Note: File to RSD vickiv 
07-05-07 Filed: Motion To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim vickiv 
Filed by: HANCOCK, RENAE 
07-05-07 Tracking started for Motion. Review date Nov 08, 2007. vickiv 
07-05-07 Filed: Answer vickiv 
RENAE HANCOCK 
07-10-07 Note: Address changed from P 0 BOX 9732 
OGDEN UT 84409-0732 vickiv 
07-10-07 Note: Address changed to WCCF #215687 P.O. BOX 14000 OGDEN UT 
84412 vickiv 
07-10-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 070902904 ID 10089087 vickiv 
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this 
case for the following reasons: 
An Answer has been filed by the defendant. 
tinted: 07/17/07 13:29:01 Page 2 








-07 Note: Address changed from 
-07 Note: Address changed to 4375 WEBER RIVER DR #60 OTDEN UT 
84405 
-07 Tracking started for Motion. Review date Jul 17, 2007. 
-07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Jul 31, 
2007. 
-07 Note: HOLD JUNE 1 


























Filed: Prepared order waiving plaintiffs fees costs and 
securities 
Filed: Summons - PROOF OF SERVICE NOT ATTACHED TO SUMMONS 
Filed: Amended complaint of Harassment, Malicious Mischief, 
Obstruction of Justice, Perjury, Submitting Fase Claims, 
Conspiracy to commit Perjury and Obstruction of Justice and 
Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress, Maliciou: 
Prosec 
07 Note: Rec Order waiving plaintiffs fees costs and securities 
07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Aug 05, 
2007. 
07 Note: FILE TO EWJ: ORDER WAIVING PLAINTIFFS FEE'S 
07 Tracking ended for Motion. 
07 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
07 Tracking - Under advisement, changed to Review date Aug 12, 
2007. 
07 Filed return: Proof of Service -Summons not attached to proof 
Party Served: WILLARD LOWE 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 11, 2007 
Notice to Submit Exparte Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Affidavit of impecuniosity 
Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Aug 14, 
2007. 
07 Note: Filing fee waiver denied by Judge Jones. Plaintiff must 
pay filing fee in full before any further pleadings may be 
filed. 
07 Note: Order waiving plaintiff!s fees, 
filed unsigned, denied by Judge Jones. 
07 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
07 Tracking ended for Under advisement. 
07 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
07 Fee Account created Total Due: 
07 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
r Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT 
07 Filed: Motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
/^Filed by: MILES, BRANDEN B 






































Printed: 07/17/07 13:27:53 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 070902903 Miscellaneous 
07-05-07 Note: Rec Notice to make entry of default by defendant & order debbiekc 
05-07 Note: Rec Order awarding Judgment for plaintiff by default of 
defendant debbiekc 
07-09-07 Filed return: (copy Duplicate) Affidavit of Service debbiekc 
Party Served: WILLARD LOWE 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 11, 2007 
07-10-07 Filed: Ex parte Motion submitting prepared order for final 
Judgment debbiekc 
Filed by: CODY, JASON 
07-10-07 Filed: Notice to Submit Exparte Motion for Final Judgment debbiekc 
07-10-07 Note: Rec Order of Judgment in Favor of the plaintiff debbiekc 
07-12-07 Filed: Certificate of Service debbiekc 
07-12-07 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Sep 10, 
2007. debbiekc 
Printed: 07/17/07 13:27:53 Page 3 (last) 
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Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitlecT/even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any 
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included \n the judgment, insert the amount thereof In a blank left \n the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
http://www.utcoiHts.gov^ 6/11 /2007 
Rule 55. Default 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend 
as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against 
the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court, in all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine 
the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside m accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In ail 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state 
of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
http://www.ut<xn^ 6/11 /2007 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER 






Amended Complaint Of: 
Harassment, Malicious Mischief, 
Obstruction of Justice, Perjury, 
Submitting False Claims, Conspiracy 
To Commit Perjury and Obstruction 
of Justice, Intentional Infliction of 
Extreme Emotional Distress, and 
Abusive and Malicious Prosecution 
Civil Case No. 070902903 MI 
The Honorable Judge 
Ernie W. Jones 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Jason Cody, Pro Se, and he complains against Defendant 
and alleges as follows: 
FERST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Harassment) 
1. Defendant engaged in actions to hamss Plaintiff by making various gestures at 
Plaintiff and by calling Plaintiff vulgar names and using obscene language. 
2. Defendant caused a potted tree to be placed in the roadway near to Plaintiffs 
driveway to make it difficult for Plaintiff to access and egress his driveway. 
3. Defendant parked his pickup track with large camper shell in the roadway at 
the end of Plaintiffs driveway making it dangerous for Plaintiff to exit his driveway due 
to the obstructed view. This was contrary to the Park's rules. 
4. Defendant further harassed P l a k ^ 
leased property after he had been told not to trespass. 
5. Defendant harassed Plaintiff by taking unwelcome photos of the Plaintiff and 
his spouse and their home and cars. 
FIRST CAUSE ADBENDUMS 
1. Beginning 8:30 PM, June 25,2005, Defendant called Plaintiff, "The strangest 
fbcker I have ever seen." At approximately 8:00 PM on May 1,2006, Defendant told 
Plaintiff, "you're an asshole." I have the first instance recorded on audio tape, for the 
second I have to eye and ear witnesses. There were several other occasions when he 
called me "Asshole" or "you're a fbcker*, but I have no evidence other than my 
testimony. On many occasions between June 26,2005 and May 18,2006, the Defendant 
shook his fist at me, or flipped me the bird (meaning "fuck you"), or pointed his right 
hand index finger at me imitating a handgun and would drop his extended thumb like the 
hammer on a pistol pretending to shoot me. This behavior was witnessed by four other 
people besides myself They are Ursula Cody, Gary Klema, Joe Gold, and Leroy Eck. 
Hie gesture of pretending to shoot me with a pistol was especially disturbing as I 
knew that Renee Hancock had testified in Judge Heffeman's court in December of 2005 
that at the urging of Mr. Lowe, she had acquired a concealed weapon carry permit, which 
led me to believe that both, she and Mr. Lowe, were both armed with handguns, and she 
testified that she had obtained the carry peimit specifically to protect herself from me, the 
Page 2 
Plaintiff^  and that was of great concern to me as I believed I had two people next door that 
were off their rocker with paranoid delusions about me and they were both likely armed 
when allowing themselves to be in my proximity. I was afiaid that these old looneys 
could shoot me in the back at anytime because of the irrational fear they expressed they 
had of me. I have witnesses who can testify that I told them of my very deep concern. 
2. The only plansible explanation for this is that they were intentionally harassing 
me by potting this potted tree in the roadway, not on Ms. Hancock's leased property, but 
in the public roadway and ostensibly at the direction of Annette Wright, the property 
manager for the trailer park, who has been trying to evict me since the spring of 2002. 
3. However, when I complained to the park manager that this behavior was 
endangering people, especially children, on Inly 6,2005, she apparently took no action to 
alleviate the situation as I was able to take photos of Mr. Lowe's track being improperly 
parked and causing this hazard for over 30 consecutive days in July and August of 2005. 
I can also produce several eye witnesses, such as Joe Gold, Nicholas Stone, Ursula Cody, 
Charles Leverton, Gary Kiema, Leroy Eck, Mark Lucas, Marianne Brunker, etc. 
4. This occurred in the summer months of 2005 for the most part, and was done 
to aggravate me. I even have one photo of Mr. Low7e standing in my driveway on the 
wrong side of a no trespassing sign on the afternoon of July 28,2005 at approximately 2 
PM. There were witnesses as well, but I have a photo and an audio recording of myself 
telling Mr. Lowe to cease trespassing while he continued to ignore me and remained on 
my property. When I complained to the park manager, she said it was minor and I should 
tolerate it. She did nothing to stop it, so I went to the city police and complained and 
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showed them the photo. They took the photo for evidence and said they would file a 
report, hot nothing wm done to stop it other than an officer spoke to Mr. Lowe and told 
Mm not to trespass anymore. Mr. Lowe denied trespassing and told the officer that there 
was no wa> for him to be certain that what I was claiming as my driveway might not be a 
part of my leased property and ft could even be pari of his girlfriend's (Renee Hancock) 
leased property. Mr. Lowe wanted to see my property deed and unbelievably the police 
officer agreed with him. I was so frustrated that I walked away. 
5. Again he did this to aggravate me and I took a few photos of him doing tMs at 
A arions tunes during 2005 sml the first 4 and M months of 2006, birt the best one is a 
video I recorded on my camcorder on Ma> 1S> 2006> immediately prior to Mr. Lowe's 
attack on me (also on video) at about 5 in the afternoon. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Malicious Mischief) 
1. Defendant Is responsible for damage to Plaintiffs vehicle, (scratches in the 
paint), b; causing his friend's front yard gate to open and strike Plaintiffs vehicle while it 
was parked in Plaintiffs driveway. 
2. Defendant caused damage to Plaintiff's property by watering a shed wall of the 
Plaintiff's while watering his friend's yard. 
3. Defendant.without provocations, attacked and physically assaulted Plaintiff 
while Plaintiff was standing at the end of his driveway, a very short while later, 
Defendant's friend joined in the assault of the Plaintiff. 
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SECOND CAUSE ADDENDUMS 
1. I have the date and time this occurred during the late summer of 2005, as well 
as a photo showing the open gate against my track and Mr. Lowe mowing the lawn of 
Renee Hancock who saw me take the picture and closed her gate as soon as I had walked 
away. 
2. I have photos of this as well as documentation of the dates are displayed in the 
photos. I also have date documented photos of the black mold caused by the watering, 
depicting the extensive damage to my wooden shed and can produce eye witnesses to 
both the watering of the shed which never took place prior to July 2005 and the damage 
resulting, these witnesses are Ursula Cody, Wayne Burrows, and Leroy Eck. 
3. Oa May 18,2006, at about 5:00 PM, the Defendant assaulted and battered the 
Plaintiff by knocking Plaintiffs camcorder into his face causing two bruises and 
subsequently struck Plaintiff numerous times attempting to strike Plaintiff in his groin 
and then bit the Plaintiff s hand causing a great deal of pain as well as two puncture 
wounds and a laceration from Defendant's teeth. Defendant was joined in this attack on 
the Plaintiff by his friend Renee Hancock. Paragraphs 2 and 3 were done with malicious 
aforethought, perhaps paragraph 1 also. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Obstruction of Justice) 
1. Defendant has provided false erroneous information and statements to the 
police in attempts to cause problems for the Plaintiff and causing Plaintiff to be arrested 
and jailed by the city police. 
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2, Defendant has provided false and erroneous information to the courts causing 
them to take action against the Plaintiff. 
THIRD CAUSE ADDENDUMS 
1. On May 18.2006. in the late afternoon. Defendant gave statements to 
Rtverdale Police concerning an altercation with the Plaintiff that had just occurred at 
about 5:00 PM. These statements were false and accused the Plaintiff of crimes which he 
did not commit. On the basis of the statements of the Defendant the Plaintiff was 
arrested and jailed at that time, Defendant stated that Plaintiff attacked when truly 
Willard Lowe attacked Plaintiff. 
2. Defendant gave the same false information in four different court hearings and 
trials, wherein based upon this false information the courts made deeisions adverse to the 
Plaintiff The courts were; Judge Hadley-June. 2006: Judge Morris Preliminary-Summer 
2006: Judge Dutson-Oeioher 2006 and Judge Moms-February 15, 2007, Defendant also 
gave false testimony in Judge Heffernan's court in December of 2005. but no adverse 
action was taken against Plaintiff, Defendant's false information included alleged 
damage of a camera, eye glasses and hearing aid. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Perjury) 
1. Defendant has sworn to false information in affidavits. 
2. Defendant has given false testimony to the courts on several occasions 
concerning the Plaintiff 
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FOURTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS 
1. Defendant provided an affidavit in Judge Hadley's court in June 2006, wherein 
Defendant falsely st^tod that Plaintiff attacked Defendant without provocation on May 18, 
2006. Plaintiff has a video recording of part of the incident which clearly proves that 
Willard Lowe attacked Jason Cody. 
2. Defendant has falsely accused Plaintiff of allegations against Plaintiff first 
provided in the witness and/or victims statement to Riverdale City Police on May 18, 
2006, and May 19.2006. Defendant has committed this perjury in four different court 
hearings and trials: Judge Hadley's court on or about June 21, 2006; Judge Morris5 court 
preliminary hearing on assault charges filed against Plaintiff in the summer of 2006, 
Judge Dutson\s court on or about October 4, 2006, and Judge Morris' court on or about 
February 15,2007, 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Submitting False Claims) 
1. Defendant has submitted false erroneous claims to the court with regard to 
medical expenses and damaged property replacement through restitution. 
FIFTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS 
1. Defendant, Willard Lowe, alleged Plaintiff intentionally caused damage to his 
$250.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Dollar) eyeglasses on May 18, 2006 as well as his $1500.00 
(One Thousand Five Hundred Dollar) hearing aid and his, first $300,00 (Three Hundred 
Dollar) then $400.00 (Four Hundred Dollar), friend's digital camera. Defendant. Willard 
Lowe, also initially claimed that Plaintiff had caused him a broken nose. He filed a claim 
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with Judge Morris' court some time in February or March 2007, through Adult Probation 
and Parole, claiming $650.00 (Six Hundred Fifty Dollars) to replace his glasses plus 
$100.00 (One Hundred Dollars) in gasoline expenses for medical visits in connection 
with the incident of May 18,2006. Plaintiff can prove through court transcripts and 
evidence that Defendant, Willard Lowe, admitted that Plaintiff had not caused him to 
suffer a broken nose and the evidence proves that there was nothing wrong with his 
hearing aid, but rather it was discovered that he could not hear well because his ear canal 
was full of wax. It was also proved that there was nothing wrong with the lenses of 
Defendant, Willard Lowe's eyeglasses and he really only required new frames. He 
provided Judge Morris' court with a receipt for the replacement of his eyeglasses in the 
amount of approximately $281.00 (Two Hundred Eighty One Dollars) in the summer of 
2006 and/or February 15,2007, this receipt was apparently for eye exam, new lenses, and 
new frames. Also, it is difficult to imagine that the Defendant traveled 500 miles for 
Doctor visits. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conspiracy to Commit Perjury and Obstruction of Justice) 
1. Defendant has conspired with other persons to submit false information to 
police and false testimony to the courts. 
SIXTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS 
1. Defendant, Willard Lowe conspired with Renee Hancock, to provide false 
information and testimony to the authorities on May 18 and 19,2006 to Riverdale Police, 
on or about June 21, 2006 to Judge Hadley's court, on or about October 4,2006 to Judge 
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Dutson's court, and February 15,2007 to Judge Morris' court. This was the same false I 
information described in the foregoing THIRD, FOURTH, and FIFTH CAUSES OF 
ACTION in this complaint. Their goal was to lose Plaintiff as a neighbor by having him 
evicted and to be jailed and made to pay money for being a bad neighbor. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress) 
1. Through the afore mentioned actions of the Defendant, he has caused Plaintiff 
to be evicted from his home of 34 years, and the dissolution of his marriage, ad the 
subsequent loss of his home itself Also causing Plaintiffs health problems and 
exacerbation of various diseases and disorders suffered by Plaintiff, thereby causing 
Plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional distress. 
SEVENTH CAUSE ADDENDUMS 
1. Because of the false statements and false accusations of the Defendant, Willard 
Lowe, regarding the Plaintiff he was a significant part of the reason MHP #9 filed two 
unlawful detainer actions against the Plaintiff, the first of which was brought in August 
2005, Civil Case No. 050904644, wherein the Plaintiff was accused of making threats 
and which was defended Pro Se, with a favorable decision for Plaintiff in that case, Jason 
Cody. The second of which was tried in Judge Dutson's court on or about October 4, 
2006, and was initially defended, Pro Se, but ultimately by brand new attorneys and the 
Plaintiff lost that case due to the conspiracy and perjury of Defendant and friend. 
Plaintiff was the subject of a criminal case tried before Judge Morris on February 15, 
2007, in which he was convicted of a felony and two Class A misdemeanors due mostly 
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to the conspiracy and perjury of Defendant and friend. Plaintiff has also been the subject 
of a civil stalking injunction hearing wherein the Plaintiff defended Pro Se in Judge 
Hadley's court on or about June 21,2006, and a decision unfavorable to the Plaintiff, 
Jason Cody, was rendered due to the conspiracy and perjury of the Defendant and friend. 
One of the results of being repeatedly involved in litigation for two entire years because 
of the false accusations of the Defendant and friend, has been the unbelievable amount of 
stress involved, which progressed into Ulcerative Colitis, Stress Induced Exacerbations of 
Severe Asthma and episodes of Schizophrenia and the more ordinary, but still unpleasant 
and unwelcome afflictions of G.E.R.D. and insomnia and the irritability that accompanies 
them, not to mention the stress of worrying that my neighbor, Renee Hancock, and/or her 
friend, Willard Lowe, may shoot me at anytime due to their irrational paranoid delusions 
about me and the knowledge acquired in court, December 2,2005, that they have 
concealed weapons permits that were acquired just because of me. These medical 
conditions and their proximate cause can be coo berated by Stephen Bruce, M.D. Besides 
the suffering involved there is also the expense of the medications and medical visits to 
professionals. Unfortunately the Plaintiff was not the only one affected by this enormous 
amount of unrelenting stress, as his wife, Ursula Cody, also suffered greatly and it all 
became to much for her to bear in the summer of 2006 when she filed for divorce because 
she couldn't stand the stress of these legal difficulties continually being brought against 
me. It destroyed our marital relationship and she was granted her divorce in November of 
2006, and then she lost her home valued at $34,000.00 (Thirty Four Thousand Dollars) 
that same month of November 2006 when she was evicted from the trailer park and 
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forced to move her trailer as well supposedly because I had been legally evicted. She sold 
her home for $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) to some vulture who was happy to take 
advantage of her dire predicament, all caused by the Defendant and friend with their false 
accusations and testimony. Plaintiff felt that he had a responsibility to her and obligated 
himself to pay his ex-wife $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) for her loss of home. 
In addition to that obligation incurred by the Plaintiff, because of the improper and 
wrongful actions and statements of the Defendant and friend, Renee Hancock, the 
Plaintiff is now obligated to pay the government additional income taxes of 
approximately $1200.00 (One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars) per year and the value of 
the loss of his spouse, due to the Defendant's wrongful acts, is incalculable but for 
purposes of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff claims a minimum value of $100,000.00 (One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars) for the loss of his spouse due to the continual legal problems 
sprouting from all the wrongful acts and statements of the Defendant and his friend, 
Renee Hancock, which were and are outrageous, intolerable, immoral, indecent, illegal, 
utterly revolting and indefensible. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Abusive and Malicious Prosecution of Plaintiff) 
1. On May 18,2006, at about 5:00 PM, Willard Lowe and Renee Hancock made 
serious criminal accusations and gave untruthful statements to the Riverdale City Police 
alleging that the Plaintiff had assaulted them and also caused damage to their property 
intentionally. This caused the Plaintiff to be arrested, jailed and prosecuted for serious 
crimes for which the Plaintiff was convicted of by a Bench Trial in the court of Judge 
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John Morris on February 15,2007 and then jailed again and ordered to pay restitution and 
other costs totaling over $3000.00 (Three Thousand Dollars) all tolled. Additionally 
Plaintiff has had to pay $7,000.00 (Seven Thousand Dollars) for attorney fees in his 
defense which unfortunately for Plaintiff was not successful due to the Defendant and 
friend committing perjury against the Plaintiff. The damages Plaintiff suffered due to the 
false testimony of the Defendant and friend, including his incarceration and restrictions 
on his liberty due to probation terms will easily exceed $100,000.00 (One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars), and were brought about by the malice of the Defendant and friend, 
because if they had been truthful in their statements to Police and their testimony to the 
courts it would have been them that was prosecuted rather than the Plaintiff. Defendant 
and friend tried very haixi to have Plaintiff sent to prison for crimes he is innocent of, due 
to their hatred of the Plaintiff. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1. An award of actual damages, (direct and consequential), in the amount of 
$50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Dollars). Plus special damages for CAUSE OF ACTION 
NO. 7 in an amount to be determined by the court. 
2. An award of punitive damages four times the amount of actual damages 
awarded. 
3. For all costs incurred herein and for reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of 
at least $250.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Dollars). 
4. For interest on all judgment awards, at the highest legal rate in the state of 
Utah. 
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5. And for such other and further relief as the court may deem proper. 
Dated this day of August 2007 
Mr. Jason Cody 
ProSe 
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